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CASENOTES 
CIVIL PROCEDURE - QUASI-IN-REM JURISDICTION 
ATTACHMENT - INSURER'S OBLIGATIONS TO DEFEND 
AND INDEMNIFY INSURED NOT ATTACHABLE FOR PUR-
POSES OF JURISDICTION. BELCHER v. GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES' INSURANCE CO., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978). 
In the recent decision of Belcher v. Government Employees' 
Insurance Company!, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an 
insurer's contractual obligations to defend and indemnify its insured 
were merely "uncertain" and "contingent"2 obligations and, there-
fore, were not attachable ,for purposes of obtaining quasi-in-rem 
jurisdiction.3 The court of appeals' holding is consistent with that of 
the growing number of jurisdictions that have refused to allow quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction to be based upon the garnishment of an absent 
defendant's liability insurance policy.4 I'll a well-reasoned opinion, 
the court explicitly rejected the New York Court of Appeals' decision 
of Seider v. Roth,5 which held that an insurer's contractual 
obligations to defend and indemnify were attachable "debts," which 
could serve as the basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the 
insured.6 In rejecting Seider, the Belcher court refused to construe 
Maryland's attachment statute to allow what would have been, in 
effect, a direct action against the insurer, a procedure not sanctioned 
by the Maryland General Assembly.? 
Despite the emphatic rejection of Seider, however, the court 
specifically recognized the strong public policy arguments favoring 
proper compensation for motorists injured on Maryland highways,S 
intimating that "direct actions" against the insurer in situations 
similar to that presented may be appropriate, but require legislative 
1. 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978). 
2. Id. at 723, 387 A.2d at 773. 
3. A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated 
property. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular 
persons in designated property. The latter is of two types. In one the 
plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property 
and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of 
particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he 
concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim 
against him. RESTATEMENT JUDGMENTS, 5-9. 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958). This second type of quasi-in-
rem judgment was further distinguished in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 
207-09 (1977), to include those cases 1) where the cause of action is related to 
rights and duties growing out of the ownership of property, e.g., duty of property 
owner to person entering land and injured thereon; and 2) where the cause of 
action is completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action. 
4. 282 Md. at 772 n.2, 387 A.2d at 773 n.2. 
5. 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). 
6. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. 
7. 282 Md. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775. 
8.Id. 
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action. This Note examines the Belcher decision and analyzes the 
implications of. direct action statutes as a possible legislative 
response. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The controversy in Belcher, presenting the "typical"9 Seider-type 
factual scenario, arose out of a three-car, chain-reaction collision at a 
Montgomery County intersection. The insured, Roger Norman Hall, 
drove his car into the rear of a car driven by Robert A. Hornickle.lO 
Hornickle's vehicle then struck the rear of a vehicle driven by 
Plaintiff Warren Belcher. The information Roger Hall gave to the 
investigating officer indicated that he resided in Hyattsville, 
Maryland.H 
Subsequent to the accident, Mr. Belcher, himself a Maryland 
resident, initiated settlement negotiations with Mr. Hall's insurance 
carrier, the Government Employees' Insurance Company (hereinaf-
ter GEICO). When the negotiations proved fruitless, however, Mr. 
Belcher and his wife filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County seeking $150,000 in damages. 12 After two unsuccessful 
attempts at personal service on Roger Hall, the summons having 
been returned non est,13 the Belchers attempted both to find Hall by 
means of a locator service and to obtain his new address from 
GEICO. Such efforts were unavailing, and the Belchers concluded 
that Roger Hall was no longer a resident of Maryland. 14 "Somewhat 
in desperation,"15 the Belchers resorted to the attachment procedures 
that became the focal issue of the case. 
Aware that state law required Mr. Hall to maintain at least 
$20,000 of automobile liability insurance,16 the Belchers amended 
9. By "typical/' it is meant that the facts present a situation whereby the plaintiff 
is unable to secure in personam jurisdiction over the responsible tortfeasor, and, 
therefore, resorts to attaching the defendant's liability insurance policy. See, e.g., 
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aiI'd on reh. en bane, 410 
F.2d 117, eert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Javorek v. The Superior Court of 
Monterey County, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976); Seider v. 
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). 
10. Brief for Appellants at 2, Belcher v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718,387 
A.2d 770 (1978). 
11. Id. at 3. 
12. 282 Md. at 719, 387 A.2d at 771. 
13. Id. at 720, 387 A.2d at 771. 
14. Plaintiffs attempted to secur~ Roger Hall's new address from GEl CO. GEICO, 
however, refused to divulge this information, claiming such disclosure would be 
"contrary to the protection required by the policy and might be tantamount to 
'bad faith'." Brief for Appellants at E-21, Belcher v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 
282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978). 
15. 282 Md. at 720, 387 A.2d at 77l. 
16. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103(b) (1977) requiring automobile liability 
insurance, or other form of "security" to satisfy "claims for bodily injury or 
death arising from an accident of up to $20,000 for anyone person and up to 
$40,000 for any two or more persons, in addition to interest and costs." 
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their declaration to demand that sum.17 The plaintiffs then sought 
the issuance of an attachment on original process18 against GEICO 
for "property or credits" in the company's hands that belonged to 
Roger Hall. The Belchers contended that GEICO's obligations under 
the terms of the insurance policy, specifically its obligations to 
defend any suit on Mr. Hall's behalf, and its obligation to indemnify 
the insured upon recovery of a judgment,19 constituted "property or 
credits" subject to attachment. The order for attachment on original 
process was issued by Judge Ralph Miller of the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County.20 When GEICO's subsequent motion to quash 
the attachment was granted by Montgomery County Circuit Court 
Judge Robert E. Clapp, Jr.,21 the Belchers sought appellate review of 
the order in the Court of Special Appeals. Because of the issue's 
significance, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari.22 
II. THE BELCHER DECISION 
Because attachment proceedings are "derived from a special and 
limited statutory power,"23 it was encumbent upon the Belchers to 
bring their case within the applicable Maryland attachment statute, 
which provides that, 
[A] court of law including the District Court, within the 
limits of its jurisdiction, may issue an attachment on 
original process against any property or credits, whether 
matured or unmatured, belonging to the debtor upon the 
17. 282 Md. at 720, 387 A.2d at 771. 
18. The plaintiffs proceeded in accordance with Md. R. P. G40, which provides, in 
part, that: 
[A]n attachment on original process may issue against any property or 
credits, whether matured or unmatured, belonging to the debtor upon the 
application of any person who has the right to become a plaintiff in an 
action in this State in any of the following instances: 
a. Non Resident Debtor 
Where the debtor is a nonresident individual or if a corporation, 
where the corporation does not have a resident agent. 
See text accompanying note 24 infra, for similar provision in MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-302 (1974). 
19. 282 Md. at 721-22, 387 A.2d at 772. For the insurance policy provisions, see note 
25 infra. 
20. Brief for Appellants at E-9, Belcher v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 
387 A.2d 770 (1978). 
21. [d. at E-31. 
22. 282 Md. at 718, 387 A.2d at 770. In his memorandum and order quashing the 
attachment, Judge Clapp ruled that the issue had "not been dealt with heretofore 
in Maryland." Brief for Appellants at E-30, Belcher v. Government Emp. Ins. 
Co., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978). 
23. [d. at 720, 387 A.2d at 772. See also Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wetherall, 
Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384, 298 A.2d 1,5 (1972); Killen v. American Casualty Co. of 
Reading, Pa., 231 Md. 105, 108, 189 A.2d 103, 105 (1963); Cole v. Randall Park 
Holding Co., 201 Md. 616, 623, 95 A.2d 273, 277 (1953). 
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application of a person who has a right to become a plaintiff 
in an action in the state.24 
Therefore, in order for the Belchers to initiate the suit by attaching 
the obligations under the liability insurance policy, it was necessary 
to establish that such obligations, specifically "the obligation of the 
garnishee [GEICO] to indemnify its assured for any judgment 
[petitioners] obtain, and [GEICO's] obligation to provide a defense to 
the claim against the insured"25 were "property or credits" belonging 
to the absent Roger Hall.26 In support of their position that the 
contract obligations were attachable, the Belchers attempted to 
persuade the court of appeals to adopt the reasoning of the 
24. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-302 (1974). 
25. 282 Md. at 721-22,387 A:2d at 772. Roger Hall's policy with GEICO provided, in 
pertinent part: 
Part I - Liability 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of: 
A. bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury', sustained by any person; 
B. injury to or destruction of property, including loss of use thereof, 
hereinafter called 'property damage'; arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the owned automobile or any non-owned 
automobile, and the company shall defend any suit alleging such bodily 
injury or property damage and seeking damages which are payable 
under the terms of this policy, even if any of the allegations are 
groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such 
investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. 
* * * 
CONDITIONS 
* * * 
6. Action Against Company - Part I: 
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent 
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this 
policy, nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have 
been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after 
actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the 
company. 
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who 
has secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be 
entitled to recover under this policy to the extent of the insurance 
afforded by this policy. No person or organization shall have any right 
under this policy to join the company as a party to any action against 
the insured to determine the insured's liability, nor shall the company be 
impleaded by the insured or his legal representative. 
Id. at 721-22 n.1, 387 A.2d at 772 n.1 (emphasis in original). 
26. 282 Md. at 721, 387 A.2d at 772. 
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controversial27 New York Court of Appeals' decision of Seider v. 
Roth.28 
The dispute in Seider arose when the plaintiffs, New York 
residents, were injured in an automobile accident in Vermont 
allegedly through the negligence of defendant Lemiux, a resident of 
Quebec.29 Lemiux was insured under an automobile liability 
insurance policy issued to him in Quebec by the Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company (hereinafter Hartford), which also did 
business in New York. Although there was no basis for personal 
jurisdiction over Lemiux in New York,30 plaintiffs attached the 
27. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), has not 
been well received by courts or commentators. Courts rejecting the Seider 
approach to the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction include Tessier v. State 
Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 1299 (1st Cir. 1972) (applying Massachusetts 
law); Sykes v. Beal, 393 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Conn. 1975); Javorek v. The Superior 
Court of Monterey County, 17 Cal. 3d 624,552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976); 
Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So. 2d 701 (La. 1972); State ex rel. Government Emp. 
Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1970); Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 
367 A.2d 1219 (1976); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 
(Okla. 1972); DeRentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. 
Allen, 254 S.C. 463, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970). See also Robinson v. O.F. Shearer, 429 
F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970) (applying federal maritime and Pennsylvania law); Ricker 
v. LaJoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Utah 1970); Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 
124,427 P.2d 390 (1967); Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974). 
For commentators criticizing the Seider approach, see, e.g., Reese, The 
Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction over Non-Residents - New York Goes Wild, 35 
INS. Co. L. REV. 660 (1971); Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or 
Putting Seider Back Into Its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1971); Stein, 
Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1075 (1968); 
Comment, Jurisdiction - Quasi in Rem: Seider v. Roth to Turner v. Evers -
Wrong Means To a Right End, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 504 (1974); Note, Seider v. 
Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 58 (1968); Note, Seider v. 
Roth: Attachment of an Insurer's Obligation to Defend, 71 DICK. L. REV. 653 
(1967). 
28. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Seider was reaffirmed in 
Simpson v. Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, motion 
for reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1967). 
Although other courts have sustained the validity of Seider, these decisions 
generally limit or qualify its application. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 
F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd on reh. en bane, 410 F.2d 117, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
844 (1969) (upholding the constitutionality of Seider, but emphasizing the fact 
that plaintiff was a New York resident); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 
(D. Minn. 1973) (limited availability of Seider doctrine to resident plaintiffs); 
Savchuk v. Rush, __ Minn. __ , 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated and remanded, 
433 U.S. 902 (1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 2290 (Minn. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 47 
U.S.L.W. 3543 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-952) (Seider available where plaintiff a 
resident of Minnesota); Camire v. Sciezka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976) 
(limiting Forbes v. Boynton to the facts of that case); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 
N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973) (Seider procedure available against a nonresident 
defendant where defendant's home state has approved Seider); Donawitz v. 
Danek, 53 A.D.2d 679, 366 N.E.2d 253, 385 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1977) (limited Seider to 
New York resident plaintiffs). 
29. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313,269 N.Y.S.2d at 100. 
30. Lemiux, not having any "minimum contacts" with New York, was not amenable 
to personal jurisdiction under the doctrine of International Shoe v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify its insured as a basis 
for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Hartford was served the attachment 
papers in New York, and defendant Lemiux was personally served 
with summons and complaint in Quebec.31 
The New York Court of Appeals, over sharp dissent,32 upheld the 
attachment as a valid exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.33 The 
court, interpreting New York's attachment statutes,34 found Hart-
ford's obligations under the policy, to "defend Lemiux in any 
automobile negligence action and, if judgment be rendered against 
Lemiux, to indemnify him therefor,"35 to be a debt or cause of action 
within the meaning of the New York statute, and therefore subject to 
attachment.36 Judge Burke, dissenting, noted that "[t]he so-called 
'debt' which is supposed to be subject to attachment is a mere 
promise made to the nonresident insured by the foreign insurance 
carrier to defend and indemnify the Canadian resident if a suit is 
31. 17 N. Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N. Y.S.2d at 100. 
32. The reasoning in Judge Burke's dissent has been adopted by most courts that 
have rejected Seider. See, e.g., Javorek v. The Superior Court of Monterey 
County, 17 Cal. 3d 624, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976). 
33. 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. 
34. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §5201(a) (McKinney 1978) provides in part: 
A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due 
or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment 
debtor, whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a 
resident or nonresident, unless it is exempt from application to the 
satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action 
which could be assigned or transferred accruing within or without the 
state. 
In conjunction, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 6202 (McKinney 1978) provides that "[a]ny 
debt or property against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided 
in section 5201 is subject to attachment. The proper garnishee of any such 
property or debt is the person designated in section 5201 .... " 
35. 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The Seider majority 
reasoned that "as soon as the accident occurred there was imposed on Hartford a 
contractual obligation that should be considered a 'debt' within the meaning" of 
the New York attachment statutes. Id. The majority found that such decision 
necessarily followed the result reached in their earlier decision in Matter of 
Riggle's Estate, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962). In that 
case, Mabel Wells, a New York resident, brought a negligence action in New 
York against Robert Riggle, an Illinois resident, for injuries suffered in an 
automobile accident in Wyoming. Riggle was personally served with summons 
and complaint in New York. He died, however, prior to trial. To maintain the 
action in New York, the trial court appointed an administrator for any property 
Riggle left in New York. The only property allegedly left by Riggle in that state 
was the obligation of the insurance carrier to defend and indemnify him. The 
court of appeals concluded that this obligation constituted "a debt owing to a 
decedent by a resident" of New York, which was regarded as personal property 
under the Surrogate's Court Act sufficient for the appointment of an ancillary 
administrator. 11 N.Y.2d at 76,181 N.E.2d at 437, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 417. In Seider, 
therefore, the majority concluded that if the obligation of the carrier was a debt 
that could be administered, it was likewise a debt that could be attached for the 
purpose of acquiring quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 
312, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 99. 
36. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315,269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. 
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commenced and if damages are awarded against the insured."37 
Such an obligation, he observed, was merely contingent and not 
within the definition of an attachable debt as defined by the New 
York statute.38 Judge Burke reasoned that the policy obligations of 
the insurer did not become certain until jurisdiction over the insured 
was properly obtained.39 Therefore, the plaintiffs assertion that 
jurisdiction could be based upon a promise that did not even mature 
until there was jurisdiction over the insured was untenable.40 
The existence of the policy is used as a sufficient basis for 
jurisdiction to start the very action necessary to activate the 
insurer's obligation under the policy. In other words, the 
promise to defend the insured is assumed to furnish the 
jurisdiction for a civil suit which must be validly commenced 
before the obligation to defend can possibly accrue .... It 
is indisputable that prior to the commencement of the suit 
the insurer owed no 'debt' to the insured. 41 
37. [d. at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (emphasis in original). 
38. Judge Burke, citing Dutch-American Mercantile Corp. v. Safticraft Corp., 17 
A.D.2d 421, 234 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1962), and Sheehy v. Madison Square Garden 
Corp., 266 N.Y. 44, 193 N.E. 633, 272 N.Y.S. 433 (1934), noted that "under our 
statutes 'a contingent right which did not ripen into an obligation' may not be 
the basis for an attachment to supply jurisdiction." [d. at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 316, 
269 N.Y.S.2d at 104. See also Fredrick v. Chicago Bearing Metal Co., 221 A.D. 
588,224 N.Y.S. 629 (1927); Herman & Grace v. City of New York, 130 A.D. 531, 
114 N.Y.S. 1107 (1909), aff'd mem., 199 N.Y. 600, 93 N.E. 376 (1910). 
39. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. The dissent 
distinguished Riggle, supra note 35, on two bases. First, it pointed out that in 
personam jurisdiction over the tortfeasor in Riggle had been properly obtained 
before his death. Thus, in Riggle, the insurer's obligation to defend had already 
matured. [d. at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 315,269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. Second, Judge Burke 
reasoned that "[ w ]hile an obligation to defend, even if contingent in nature, 
might constitute the estate of the decedent within the statute governing the 
appointment of an administrator, it could not, under other pertinent statutes, be 
the basis of an attachment so as to supply jurisdiction." Javorek v. The Superior 
Court of Monterey County, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 634,552 P.2d 728, 733, 131 Cal Rptr. 
768, 773 (1976). 
40. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. Judge Burke called the 
majority's approach a "bootstrap situation," a term frequently used to describe 
the circular reasoning of the Seider approach to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
this context. [d. See, e.g., Siegel, SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTARY TO N.Y. CIV. 
PRAC. LAw § 5201 (McKinney 1978); Note, 71 DICK. L. REV. 653, 660 (1967). See 
also Comment, Garinshment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the 
Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 555 (1967). 
41. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. Seider has also been 
criticized because under its approach, even after a cause of action is brought, 
"there is nothing of economic value to which the insured may make claim, 
receive, or assign." Simpson v. Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 315, 234 N.E.2d 669, 674, 
287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641, motion for rearg. denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 
290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1967) (Breitel, J., concurring). This criticism was reiterated in 
Note, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1108, 1111 (1968). See also Belcher v. Government 
Emp. Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 725 n.4, 387 A.2d 770, 774 n.4 (1978). This criticism, 
however, may also be true of any case in which intangibles are sought to be 
attached. 
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The Belcher court agreed with Judge Burke's analysis and 
refused to adopt the Seider majority's reasoning,42 finding the Seider 
approach inconsistent with prior Maryland cases holding that a 
contingent or uncertain interest is not attachable under the 
Maryland attachment statute.43 The Belcher court reasoned that the 
contractual obligation to indemnify arises "only after a judgment is 
rendered against the insured,"44 and that GEICO's duty to defend 
arises only after "litigation is properly instituted against the 
insured with service of process upon him requiring him to 
respond."45 Thus, if the court were to allow the attachment of Hall's 
policy as the basis for instituting the suit, it would be sanctioning a 
policy whereby the obligations of the insured were used to furnish 
the jurisdiction for a suit which must have been validly commenced 
42. 282 Md. 718, 725-26, 387 A.2d 770, 774-75. Despite Judge Burke's criticisms, and 
the general rejection of Seider by other courts and commentators, see note 27 
supra, New York continues to apply its basic concepts. Seider has been limited by 
the New York courts in some respects, however. For example, in Simpson v. 
Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, motion for rearg. 
denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1967), the court 
reaffirmed Seider and rejected various constitutional arguments. Denying 
reargument, the New York Court of Appeals held that any recovery under Seider 
was "necessarily limited to the value of the asset attached, that is, the liability 
insurance policy. For the purpose of pending litigation, which looks to an 
ultimate judgment and recovery, such value is its face amount and not some 
abstract or hypothetical value." [d. at 310, 238 N.E.2d at 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 
916. Moreover, the court, in a statement that one commentator has termed 
"miraculous," Siegel, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules, 
§ 5201 at p. 15 (McKinney Supp. 1968); but see Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 
106, 111 n.7 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd on reh. en bane, 410 F.2d 117, cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 844 (1969), declared "[t]his, it is hardly necessary to add, means that there 
may not be any recovery against the defendant in this sort of case in an amount 
greater than the face amount of the insurance policy even though he proceeds 
with the defense on the merits." 21 N.Y.2d at 990,238 N.E.2d at 320,290 N.Y.8.2d 
at 916 (emphasis added). The "miracle" may be explainable, however, if Seider is 
viewed as a judicially created direct action. See note 53 infra. 
Additionally, the New York court recently limited the availability of Seider-
type attachments to resident plaintiffs. The court declined to re-examine Seider, 
however, on the basis of stare decisis and the fact that the legislature had made 
no move in the eleven years since the decision to nullify or change its effect. 
Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 142,366 N.E.2d 253, 255-56, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 
595 (1977). See also Baden v. Staples, 47 U.S.L.W. 2291 (N.Y. 1978). 
43. "[W]here an interest is uncertain and contingent - in that it may never become 
due and payable - it is not subject to attachment as not within the scope of 
Maryland's attachment statute." Belcher v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 282 Md. 
at 723, 387 A.2d at 773-74. See also Suskin and Berry, Inc. v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 
304, 306 (4th Cir. 1930) (interpreting Maryland law); Fairfax v. Savings Bank of 
Baltimore, 175 Md. 136, 141, 199 A. 872, 875 (1938); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. 
Independent Brewing Ass'n, 127 Md. 463, 468-69, 96 A. 617, 619 (1916); Hodge & 
McClane, The Law of Attachment in Maryland, § 29 (1895). MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-302 (1974) provides for attachment of interests that are 
merely "unmatured," but fails to provide for the attachment of interests that are 
"contingent," and thus may never become due. 
44. 282 Md. at 725, 387 A.2d at 774. 
45. [d. 
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before the obligations could even accrue.46 The court declined to 
adopt such circular reasoning, criticizing Seider as a "classic 
example of the tail wagging the dog, a bit of judicial wizardry in 
w1!ich we decline to engage."47 
Despite its refusal to adopt the Seider approach, the cO\lrt of 
appeals was particularly sympathetic to the compelling public policy 
arguments advanced by the Belchers in support of a contrary 
result.48 Specifically, the court noted that the General Assembly's 
enactment of compulsory automobile liability insurance legisla-
tion49 indicated a "growing belief that all those injured while using 
the highways of this State should be properly recompensed."50 The 
court recognized that Maryland citizens would be faced with 
additional expenses because of increased reliance on public aid for 
support when the injured are unable to work or to pay medical bills 
incurred as a result of their injuries.51 Moreover, these results would 
follow even though the insurer "ha[d] collected his fees to pay for 
just such occurrences and very likely ha[d] set up a reserve fund 
containing all the money necessary to reimburse the injured 
parties."52 Nonetheless, the Belcher court refused to construe 
Maryland's attachment statute "to allow what, in fact, would be a 
direct action against insurers which the General Assembly has not 
46. This criticism, the focal point of Judge Burke's dissent in Seider, has convinced 
most courts considering the question to adopt reasoning similar to that of the 
Belcher court. E.g., Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (D. Conn. 1975); 
Javorek v. The Superior Court of Monterey County, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 
131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976); Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 367 A.2d 1219 (1976). 
47. 282 Md. at 725-26,387 A.2d at 775. This criticism may be unwarranted, however, 
if Seider is viewed as a "judicially created" direct action statute. See note 53 
infra. 
48. 282 Md. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775. 
49. Codified as MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 17-101 through·301 (1977). 
50. 282 Md. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775. 
51. ld. 
52.ld. 
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seen fit to permit,"53 and affirmed the circuit court's order to quash 
the writ of attachment. 54 
53. Id. For previous federal and state decisions refusing to "judicially create" a direct 
action statute, see Complaint of Harbor Towing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 
1971); Gorman v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Corp., 210 Md. 1, 121 A.2d 812 (1956). But see 
Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (direct action allowed against 
insurer without benefit of statutory authority - Wisconsin's direct action statute 
being inapplicable). 
The question of whether Seider "judicially created" a direct action statute 
has generated considerable controversy. Compare Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 
F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd on reh. en bane, 410 F.2d 117, cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 844 (1967); Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313, 319 (E.D. Wis. 1975); 
Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977), all 
finding that Seider judicially created a direct action, with Forbes v. Boynton, 313 
A.2d 129 (N.H. 1973); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (S. Ct. 
1977); Wallace v. Target Store, 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.y.s.2d 478 (S. Ct. 1977), all 
denying that Seider judicially created a direct action. 
For a direct action statute that the legislature has sanctioned, see MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A, § 481 (1972) (claimant may sue insurer after judgment if insured 
cannot satisfy). 
54. 282 Md. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775. Because Belcher was decided on the basis of the 
court's interpretation of the Maryland attachment statute, and its refusal to 
create judicially a direct action against insurers, the court did not reach the issue 
of whether "Seider-type" attachments remain constitutional. However, since the 
Supreme Court decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), this issue has 
generated much discussion and litigation. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving 
Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3168 (U.S. 1978); Note, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 410-18 (1978); 
Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court Establishes a Uniform 
Approach to State Court Jurisdiction, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 145-46 n.88 
(1978). 
Seider v. Roth has heretofore survived constitutional due process attacks 
because of the continued validity of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), which 
held that "the obligation of a debtor to pay his debt was property which 
accompanied the debtor at all times and could be garnished for purposes of 
acquiring quasi in rem jurisdiction over the creditor in any state in which the 
debtor could be served." Id. at 223. See Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner: The 
Supreme Court Establishes a Uniform Approach to State Court Jurisdiction, 35 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 133 n.22 (1978). As stated by Chief Judge Fuld, writing 
for the New York Court of Appeals in Simpson v. Lo~hman, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 
234 N.E.2d 669, 671,287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636, motion for rearg. denied, 21 N.Y.2d 
990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1967): 
It was our opinion when we decided [Seider], and it still is, that 
jurisdiction in rem was acquired by the attachment in view of the fact 
that the policy obligation was a debt to the defendant. And we perceive 
no denial of due process since the presence of that debt in this state (see, 
e.g. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.s. 215, 25 S.Ct. 625, 49 L. Ed. 1023) -
contingent or inchoate though it may be - represents sufficient of a 
property right in the defendant to furnish the nexus with, and the 
interest in, New York to empower its courts to exercise an in rem 
jurisdiction over him. 
Thus, the mere "presence" of the debt in the forum state was sufficient contacts 
for that state to exercise in rem jurisdiction. See Penn oyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 
(1878). 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), however, declared that a court's 
exercise of jurisdiction in rem could not be based solely on the presence of 
property in the forum state, and that henceforth in rem jurisdiction should be 
tested under the "minimum contacts" standard of International Shoe v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Recognizing that the phrase '''judicial 
jurisdiction over a thing', is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction 
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III. DIRECT ACTIONS AGAINST INSURERS 
The Belcher holding, adopting a position consistent with that 
taken by the majority of states considering the question, 55 was based 
upon the proper interpretation of Maryland's attachment statute. 
The result may be inequitable, however, because plaintiffs in 
positions similar to that of Warren Belcher will not be compensated 
for injuries received at the hands of a negligent motorist. Moreover, 
the Belcher decision cannot be reconciled with previous legislative 
enactments designed to facilitate recovery for those injured on 
over the interests of persons in a thing," 433 U.S. at 207, the Court reasoned that 
"in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction 
must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interests of persons 
in a thing." Id. The standard for determining "whether the interests of persons is 
consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum contacts standard 
elucidated in International Shoe." Id. Thus, the Court concluded, 
[A]lthough the presence of the defendant's property in a State might 
suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the state, and 
the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the 
State's jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the 
State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that 
forum. 
Id. at 209. 
Because Shaffer significantly undermined the type of quasi·in·rem action 
typified by Harris v. Balk, a conflict of authority developed respecting the 
continued constitutional validity of Seider. Two New York Supreme Court 
decisions, Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1977) and 
Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1977) rejected, in 
light of Shaffer v. Heitner, attempts at quasi·in·rem "Seider-type" attachments 
where the defendant's only contact with the forum state was the "presence" of 
the policy obligations. In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3168 
(U.S. 1978), however, the district court, after concluding that Seider and its 
progeny were "sui generis," id. at 1002, and that such cases could not be "pigeon 
holed," id. as in rem or in personam, held that Shaffer did not require rejection of 
either Seider v. Roth or Simpson v. Loehman. Similarly, the highest courts of the 
states of New York and Minnesota have recently upheld the validity of Seider. 
See Baden v. Staples, 47 U.S.L.W. 2291 (N.Y. 1978) and Savchuk v. Rush, __ 
Minn. _, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1978), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), 
aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 2290 (Minn. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3543 (U.S. 
1979) (No. 78-952). Thus, at least among the appellate courts that have 
considered the issue. there is agreement that Seider remains constitutional. 
For commentators discussing Seider's continued constitutional validity, see 
Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court Establishes a Uniform 
Approach to State Court Jurisdiction, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 145-46 n.88 
(1978); Note, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393,410-18 (1978); Note, 24 LoYOLA L. REV. 171, 
179-80 (1978). 
In Belcher, the property sought to be attached was not the only contact 
between the defendant, the state, and the litigation. In that case, the accident 
itself occurred in Maryland, and both plaintiff and defendant were Maryland 
residents at the time of the mishap. Because of these til~s with the forum state, it 
is likely that the Shaffer standards would have been satisfied had the court 
found the policy obligations attachable for purposes of jurisdiction. 
55. See note 27 supra. 
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Maryland roadways. 56 Thus, a legislative response to the Belcher 
decision appears imminent. 
This response will probably result in the consideration of a 
direct action statute,57 whereby the injured party is permitted to sue 
the insurer directly without first establishing the liability of the 
insured. 58 These statutes, rather than using the insured as a conduit 
to reach the insurance carrier, as is done in Seider and its progeny, 
allow the plaintiff to proceed against the insurer in the first 
instance, thereby avoiding circuitous and piecemeal litigation. 59 
Moreover, direct action statutes avoid the practical and constitu-
tional problems caused by the attachment of insurance policy 
obligations. And, by allowing the injured party to sue the insurance 
carrier, whose c.ontacts with the forum state allow the court to 
exercise in personam jurisdiction,SO direct action statutes effect 
recovery of a judgment even though the tortfeasor himself is not 
subject to jurisdiction or is evading service of process.61 
Several states have enacted such legislation.62 In Louisiana, for 
example, an injured party may, at his option, bring an action 
directly against the insurer within the terms and limits of the 
policy.63 This right of action exists regardless of whether the policy 
56. See note 49 supra. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-547 (1972) (Motor 
Vehicle Casualty Insurance - Required Primary Coverage); MD. ANN. CODE art. 
48A, §§ 243-243N (1972) (Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund). 
57. "A direct action statute expresses the state's public policy to be that all liability 
policies, subject to their terms and applicable limits, are issued for the benefit of 
all persons injured because of the negligence of the insured." 2 R. LONG, THE 
LAw OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20.06[1] (1978). The Belcher court refused to 
"judicially create" such a statute. 282 Md. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775. Seider has 
been criticized for so doing. See note 53 supra. 
Although direct action statutes allow the injured person to proceed directly 
against the insurer, it must be remembered that such statutes in no way dispense 
with the requirement of fault on the part of the insured. Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 118, 
119 n.5 (1963). 
58. Under present Maryland law, an injured party may proceed against the insurer 
after a judgment has been obtained if the insured cannot satisfy such judgment. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 481 (1972). 
59. Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict·of-Law Problems, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 357 (1960). 
60. [d. at 362, where the author states: 
Because of the great public interest in insurance and the consequent 
broad regulatory power of the state, if the action is based on even a 
single policy written in the direct action state, there is apparently no 
constitutional bar to subjecting the company to service in that jurisdic· 
tion. 
See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
61. See text -accompanying note 91 infra. 
62. GA. CODE ANN. §68-612 (1967); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22-655 (West 1959); R.1. 
GEN. LAws § 27-7-1 (1956) (1968 Reenactment); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.04 (West 
1976). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-300 (1959) (right of direct action against 
governmental subdivision otherwise immune when such government carries 
liability insurance); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 2003 (1966). 
63. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-655 (West 1959). 
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was written in Louisiana and regardless of whether the policy 
contains a provision forbidding direct actions,64 provided that the 
accident or injury occurred in Louisiana.65 
Wisconsin law is substantially similar to that of Louisiana.66 
That state's statute provides that in any action for damages caused 
by negligence, in which the insurer has an interest in the outcome of 
the controversy, the insurer may be made a proper party defend-
ant.67 
Rhode Island limits the availability of such direct actions to 
cases in which the officer serving any process against the insured 
returns such process "non est."68 Thus, under Rhode Island law, the 
injured party must make a good faith effort to locate and serve 
process on the insured tortfeasor before resorting to the direct action 
against the insurer.69 While these three statutes vary somewhat in 
form, in substance they are the same because they embody the direct 
action concept. 
These direct action statutes have presented the courts with a 
variety of questions. Although the constitutionality of Louisiana's 
statute was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Watson v. 
Employer's Liability Assurance Corporation,70 where the Court 
found that a "no action" clause7l in an insurance contract issued in 
64. [d. See also 2 R. LoNG, THE LAw OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20.06\.2] (1978) where 
it is stated that "[t]he statute [Louisiana's] has validly and completely abrogated 
the no action provision of liability policies; thus, the insurer can be joined in an 
action or sued alone even though a policy contains a no action provision 
enforceable in the state where it was issued and delivered." 
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-655 (West 1959). 
66. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.04 (West 1976). Former WIS. STAT. ANN. § 260.11(1) (1967) 
limited the availability of such direct actions to motor vehicle actions. The 
current law "expanded the statute to accord direct action to all negligence 
actions." Hasselstrom v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 50 Wis. 2d 487, 497,184 N.W.2d 902, 
907 (1971). 
67. WIS. STAT. ANN. §803.04 (West 1976). 
68. R.I. GEN. LAws §27-7-1 (1956). 
69. "'Good faith' as used in this context, connotes something more than the absence 
of fraud. The term presupposes a reasonably diligent effort to obtain service on 
the insured such as would be made if no question of insurance were involved." 
Lemieux v. American Universal Ins. Co., 116 R.I. 685, 698, 360 A.2d 540, 547 
(1976). See also Collier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 97 R.1. 315, 321, 197 A.2d 493, 496 
(1964). 
70. 348 U.S. 66 (1954). 
71. The typical "no action" clause provides as follows: 
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent 
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this 
policy, nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have 
been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after 
actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the 
company. 
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 68 n.3 (1954). 
Following Watson, the Wisconsin legislature amended its statute to provide that 
a direct action was proper "even though the policy was written outside such state 
and contained a no action provision, provided the right of action arose in ... 
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Massachusetts was without effect under Louisiana's statute, other 
questions relating to these statutes have not been definitely 
answered.72 For example, there remains the question of whether the 
insured's breach of a policy obligation, "such as giving notice of an 
accident and cooperating in the defense of an action,"73 should 
relieve the insurer from liability under the policy. This issue has 
received inconsistent treatment, depending upon the jurisdiction. 
The Louisiana court, reasoning that the direct action statute was 
designed primarily to protect injured parties,74 has held that the 
right of direct action should not be divested by acts of the insured 
that violate the provisions of his policy.75 Conversely, the Wisconsin 
position is that "the insurer would be placed at too great a 
disadvantage if it were deprived of the policy defenses,"76 and 
therefore has allowed such breaches to be used as a defense.77 
Another question is whether the insurer should be allowed to 
take advantage of personal defenses available to the insured. 
Although it has been criticized for creating liability where none 
previously existed,78 Louisiana has denied the insurer certain 
defenses such as interspousal and charitable immunity.79 Wisconsin, 
on the other hand, has held that where there is immunity on the part 
of the insured, the insurer is similarly immune from suit.80 
Finally, there is a difference of opinion as to whether direct 
action statutes should be applied retroactively to contracts predating 
[Wisconsin]." 2 R. LoNG, THE LAw OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20.06[3] (1978). See 
also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-655 (West 1959) ("This right of direct action shall 
exist ... whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct 
action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana."). 
72. For an exhaustive discussion of the many problems posed by direct action 
statutes, including a thorough examination of the collateral estoppel and. res 
adjudicata issues posed by such statutes, see Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their 
. Operational and Conflict-ot-Law Problems, 74 HARV. L. REV. 357 (1960). 
73. Id. at 365. 
74. West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 217 La. 189, _, 46 So. 2d 122, 129-30 (1950). 
75. See West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950); Edwards v. 
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929); Note, 24 LA. 
L. REV. 118 (1963). 
76. Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict·ot-Law Problems, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 357, 366 (1960). 
77. See, e.g., Tillman v. Great Am. Indem. Co. of New York, 207 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 
1953) (cooperation clause); Cespuglio v. Cespuglio, 238 Wis. 603, 300 N.W. 780 
(1941) (cooperation clause). 
78. Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict·ot-Law Problems, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 357, 364 (1960). 
79. See Harvey v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 6 So. 2d 774 (La. Ct. App. 1942) 
(interspousal immunity); Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance et 
D'Assistance Mutuelle De La Nouvelle Orleans, 170 So. 801 (La. Ct. App. 1936) 
(charitable immunity). 
80. Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 
(1944) (interspousal immunity). 
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the statute's enactment. Louisiana courts have held that the 
legislation was designed solely to effect a reform in remedy and 
procedure, and hence could be applied retroactively without 
impairing the obligation of the insurance contract.81 Wisconsin, 
however, has held that the "no action" clause in a policy secures a 
valuable right, and thus has refused to allow direct suits on 
contracts predating the statute. 82 To avoid like problems of 
interpretation, any statute considered by the Maryland General 
Assembly should necessarily explicitly provide for such contingen-
cies. 
These divergent results, while a significant consideration in 
determining the desirability and content of direct action legislation, 
are not the principal objection to such statutes. The most frequently 
expressed objection is the fear that juries will not evaluate testimony 
fairly when the defendants before them are multi-state insurance 
companies with extensive assets.83 It is reasoned that disclosure of 
the insurance company as the real party defendant will result in 
more numerous and inflated verdicts,84 and that for this reason it is 
necessary to allow the insurer to continue to defend "under cover 
without disclosing its identity to the jury."85 Although historically 
this argument may have been valid, its continued validity is 
questionable given the prevalance today of liability insurance.86 
Moreover, the fact of liability insurance may be disclosed, inadvert-
ently or not, in a variety of other ways.87 For example, the existence 
of insurance may be relevant to the question of agency or ownership 
of the vehicle88 or as bearing upon the credibility of a witness.89 
81. See Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So. 2d 297, 306 (La. Ct. App. 1951); Rossville 
Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 18 La. App. 725, 
731-32, 138 So. 183, 187 (1931). 
82. Pawlowski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932). 
83. Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-oi-Law Problems, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 357, 358 (1960). It is interesting to note that Louisiana and 
Wisconsin, two states with direct action statutes, "have experienced very low 
verdicts in comparison with other states." Note, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 504, 511 
(1974). 
84. Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-ai-Law Problems, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 357, 358 (1960). 
85. 2 R. LoNG, THE LAw OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20.06 (1978). 
Maryland adheres to the evidentiary rule that disclosure of defendant's 
coverage by liability insurance is inadmissible. See, e.g., Snowhite v. State, Use of 
Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 301, 221 A.2d 342, 347 (1966) ("Generally speaking, the law 
is well established that in an action to recover for personal injuries or wrongful 
death, evidence which informs the jury that the defendant is insured is 
inadmissible."). 
86. Note, 41 MINN. L. REv. 784, 789 (1957). See also Takoma Park Bank v. Abbott, 
179 Md. 249, 263, 19 A.2d 169, 176 (1941). 
87. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §201 (2d ed. 1972). 
88. Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 301 n.1, 221 A.2d 342, 347 n.1 
(1966). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 201 (2d 
ed. 1972). 
89.Id. 
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Furthermore, where reference to insUrance is made at trial by the 
defendant or his witness, "the testimony is admissible and is subject 
to legitimate comment and argument."90 Thus, given these excep-
tions to the general nondisclosure rule, coupled with the widespread 
existence of liability insurance, it is doubtful that today's jurors are 
totally ignorant of the fact that any damage award will be paid at 
least partially by an insurance company. Hence, the objection 
against disclosure of the insurer's interest in the litigation for fear of 
inflated verdicts may be without substance. 
Additionally, it should be noted that there may be advantages to 
the insurance company in disclosing their interest in the litigation. 
By revealing their involvement the insurer has the opportunity to 
instruct the jury on the true function of liability insurance, together 
with the social consequences resulting from the imposition of an 
unfair burden upon the company.91 Moreover, by disclosing its 
interest, the insurer avoids antagonizing informed· jurors by its 
"secretive behavior."92 Direct action legislation thus has the effect of 
allowing the injured plaintiff to sue the "real party in interest,"93 
while not imposing a substantially unfair burden upon the insurer.94 
Finally, direct action statutes "avoid the practical and constitutional 
problems caused by the attachment"95 of insurance policies, and 
provide a more desirable means to achieve basically the same result. 
The enactment of a direct action statute would prevent the 
decision in Belcher from being used affirmatively to avoid liability 
under the insurance policy, and would further the public policy 
favoring compensation to those injured on Maryland roadways.96 
Even under a statute similar to Rhode Island's, requiring that 
service of process be returned "non est" before the insurer may be 
made a party defendant,97 the plaintiff is permitted eventually to 
proceed directly against the insurer. Such a procedure appears fair, 
especially considering that "the insurer has collected his fees to pay 
for just such occurrences and very likely has set up a reserve fund 
containing all the money necessary to reimburse the injured 
parties."9B The court of appeals, however, rejected Seider's "judicially 
90. Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 302, 221 A.2d 342, 348 (1966). 
9l. Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict·of.Law Problems, 74 
. HARV. L. REV. 357, 358-59 (1960). 
92. [d. at 358. 
93. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd on reh. en bane, 
410 F.2d 117, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Note, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 504, 
512 (1974). 
94. Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict·of.Law Problems, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 357, 359 (1960). 
95. Note, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 504, 512 (1974). 
96. See text accompanying note 50 supra. 
97. See text accompanying note 68 supra. 
98. 282 Md. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775. 
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created" direct action solution99 to the problem by refusing to 
misconstrue Maryland's attachment statute. Rather, the court 
intimated that the appropriate solution should come from the 
legislature. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals in Belcher adopted a position consistent 
with that taken by the majority of courts which have considered the 
question of whether an insurer's contractual obligations to defend 
and indemnify are attachable "debts" for purposes of quasi-in-rem 
jurisdiction. The court, finding the contract provisions "uncertain" 
and "contingent," held, consistent with previous opinions interpret-
ing Maryland's attachment statute, that such interests are not 
"property or credits" within the scope of that statute. Therefore, such 
interests could not serve as the base upon which to predicate quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction. 
The Belcher court itself, however, recognized inequities in its 
decision. In particular, Maryland citizens would be burdened with 
additional expenses resulting from increased reliance on public aid 
for support when the injured are unable to work and pay medical 
bills incurred as a result of their uncompensated injuries. And, the 
decision would be inconsistent with previous legislative enactments 
indicating a "growing belief' that those injured on Maryland 
roadways should be properly recompensed. Even considering these 
strong policy arguments, however, the court was not constrained to 
misconstrue Maryland's attachment statute. Rather, the court 
intimated that the response should come from the legislature. In 
light of this implicit suggestion from the court, coupled with the 
legislature's attitude favoring proper compensation for injured 
motorists, consideration of a direct action statute is likely to be 
forthcoming .100 
Harry C. Storm 
99. See Shington v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 1969) for a true judicially 
created direct cause of action. The Florida court concluded that a "direct cause of 
action now inures to a third party beneficiary against an insurer in motor vehicle 
liability insurance coverage cases as a product of the prevailing public policy of 
Florida." See also Note, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 504, 517-22 (1974). 
100. In fact, on January 16, 1979, in response to the Belcher decision, Senate Bill No. 
122 was introduced in the Maryland General Assembly. This bill authorizes 
service of process upon a defendant's insurance carrier in any motor vehicle tort 
action once the plaintiff satisfies the court that service of process on the insured 
defendant has twice been returned non est, and that all reasonable efforts to 
obtain service upon the defendant have been made. 
Although this bill is not, in form, a "true" direct action statute because the 
insurer is merely the "agent" of the insured for purposes of accepting service of 
process, and not a party to the action, the bill is in the "nature" of a direct action 
statute, and would serve basically the same function. 
The bill received an unfavorable committee report and was not enacted. 
